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1. Introduction
How important is desire to the spiritual life? And how important is the spiritual life in any case? Different answers have been given to these questions, for there are conflicting interpretations of the nature and value of these notions, although some of the disagreements are terminological. According to a position which it is Nietzsche’s purpose to expose, and which he associates with a religious outlook, desire is undesirable, and it must be transcended if life is to be properly spiritual. A template here for the atheist’s anti-religious stance, the familiar line being that a spirituality infected by religion involves an antipathy and even hatred for all things pertaining to this world, this life, and our humanity. It gains stark expression in the following words of Nietzsche, the target in this context being the Christian idea of God:  

God having degenerated into a contradiction of life instead of its transfiguration and eternal yes! God as declared aversion to life, to nature, to the will to life! God as the formula for every slander against ‘the here and now’, for every lie about the ‘beyond’! God as the deification of nothingness, the canonization of the will to nothingness!...​[1]​

On this way of thinking then, religion involves an aversion to life and nature, this aversion is expressed in the postulation of an anti-natural and lifeless ‘beyond’, and we are to suppose that it is built into the religious person’s creed that the spiritual life is oriented towards this ‘beyond’. The general idea is captured by Janet Soskice when, in the context of describing a widespread (mis)conception of the spiritual life, she talks of something ‘still and luminous, turned to the future and far from our daily lives’.​[2]​ We can note that she registers this objection as a Christian theologian.   	Where does desire – or the lack of it – come into the disputed picture? We are to suppose that the anti-natural and lifeless ‘beyond’ corresponds to the religious person’s heaven, that it involves the transcending of all desire, and hence, that the properly spiritual life must involve aspiring to such a condition. As Ivan Soll puts it in the context of criticising the ‘dream’ of Schopenhauer (and, more generally, that of Buddhism, Stoicism, and Christianity), the aspired to condition here is one in which ‘one no longer experiences desires, longings, and wants…an existence in which we want for nothing’.​[3]​ A putatively ‘angelic ideal’ which, he claims, is more properly described as ‘a diabolical piece of work’ once we see that it involves wanting nothing. The deification of nothingness, we are to suppose, the final two sentences of his paper exhorting us to remember ‘the crucial but commonly ignored truth, that desire is itself desirable. Long live desire!’​[4]​
We have a conception of the spiritual life which takes us beyond desire, and hence, beyond life itself, assuming that desire and life are equivalent and that spiritual life, thus conceived, is a form of death. It is criticised by Nietzsche, Nietzscheans, and some theists too, Soskice’s objections pre-empting an alternative conception of spiritual life which is firmly rooted in this world. What of Nietzsche’s relation to the spiritual life? Robert Solomon tells us that ‘Nietzsche may have rejected religion in its many forms…but he never rejected spirituality. On the contrary…he attempted to “revalue” and revise our concept of spirituality…to naturalize spirituality, to get away from “other-worldly” religions and philosophies, and to reappreciate or “reenchant” everyday life’.​[5]​ We are to suppose that the envisaged re-enchantment brings the return of desire. The theme is familiar, and it should come as no surprise that a similar ‘revaluation’ of spirituality has preoccupied many contemporary atheists, like, for example, Solomon himself. ​[6]​ As he puts it, ‘[w]hatever else it may be, spirituality is passion. The spiritual life is a passionate life’.​[7]​ 
We have two ways of thinking about the spiritual life which, on the face of it, are diametrically opposed, although it is assumed on both sides that we should be aspiring to live in this way. According to the first position, it is a requirement of such a life that desire is transcended. The nature and limits of the relevant concepts is unclear, but the position is associated with a religious outlook, although there is no requirement that it be comprehended in God-involving terms, Schopenhauer being an important case in point.  The second position involves a rejection of this rejection of desire, claiming to the contrary that desire is central to the spiritual life. It is likewise unclear how broadly or narrowly these concepts are to be understood, but we can note that a blank acceptance of desire per se is surely as problematic as its wholesale rejection. After all, not all desires are desirable, like, for example, the desire to destroy someone’s life for the hell of it or to stuff one’s face to oblivion. The starting point of the pro-desire position is that the first, ‘religious’, option is a recipe for death - it is in this sense that the heaven it promises is more properly viewed as a hell – worse than a living hell we are to suppose. So desire provides the essential life-giving ingredient, although to repeat the worry, we must surely discriminate between desires in this context if the life in question is to be remotely worth living, and it is central to both the positions at hand that not just any life will do. Finally, we must allow that a proponent of the religious option has a response to the supposed objection from desire, for I have noted already that she is not invariably opposed to life on earth, and it has not been shown that her opponent has the monopoly on desire.  
The disagreements are less stark than first appears, and in what follows I want to defend the claim that the spiritual life involves desire in a manner which narrows the gap between our disputants. My initial task will be to get a preliminary fix upon the concept of a spiritual life by isolating some points of agreement. This will give a starting point from which to tackle the question of the role played by desire, the next problem being to determine the limits of this concept. The category of appetitive desire is a common starting point in such discussions, and there is a motive - consonant with the drive towards naturalism – for making it the paradigm for thinking properly and more generally about desire per se. It will become clear that it cannot cover all of the conceptual ground, and that our disputants are committed by their own lights to rejecting a conception of the spiritual life which is reducible to such terms.  
Desire involves some hidden complexity, and this means that we must be clear about what is at issue if we are to respond appropriately to claims about its relevance for the spiritual life. Schopenhauer tends to be brought in as an example of how not to proceed, but we shall see that there are insights in his position which are consonant with some recent themes in the philosophy of desire and spirituality. I shall argue that the position towards which he is gesturing – not always consistently or successfully – is to be applauded, and that it grants us the right to allow that desire is central to the spiritual life. As for Nietzsche himself, it will remain unclear what his conception of the spiritual life really amounts to. However, we shall question the validity of some of his anti-religious protestations, and take seriously the possibility that his position has more in common with his target than he would have us believe, even whilst allowing that it itself degenerates into the contradiction of life.  

2. The spiritual life: some preliminaries
It is agreed by our disputants that the spiritual life, properly understood, is fundamental to human flourishing. Solomon tells us that it embraces love, trust, reverence, and wisdom, as well as tragedy and death; that it involves ‘a sense of ourselves as identified with others and the world’; and that it is that by virtue of which the self is transformed.​[8]​ He makes clear that such transformation concerns the self’s ‘expansion’ rather than its ‘abandonment’ – a clear admonition to those for whom the spiritual life involves trading in our humanity for an empty dream.
	Soskice agrees that the spiritual life is part and parcel of what it is to be properly human, that love and morality are central in this regard, and that it has nothing to do with rejecting this life in favour of some ‘beyond’, or this human self for a disembodied spirit. Thus, we are told that what we need to attend to with love is ‘a changing world full of creatures of change – not Cartesian minds ontologically distinct from extended matter, but extended wholes’;​[9]​ that our physical natures are an essential part of the picture of the spiritual life as a good;​[10]​ and that we must reject the dualism of reason and desire which leads us to suppose that desire and appetite are ‘delusions and snares’ on the spiritual path.​[11]​ We might compare John Cottingham’s insistence that we give precedence to ‘the individual’s embarking on a path of practical self-transformation, rather than (say) simply engaging in intellectual debate or philosophical analysis’, his further claim being that the ‘spiritual’ dimension of human existence ‘cover[s] forms of life that put a premium on certain kinds of intensely focused moral and aesthetic response, or on the search for deeper reflective awareness of the meaning of our lives and of our relationship to others and to the natural world’. Cottingham writes as a theist but concedes that even the most convinced atheist would grant the significance of a spiritual life in this sense.​[12]​ 
	We have what seems to be a conception of the spiritual life that is amenable to a naturalist outlook, there being no hint of any aversion to life in the here and now. But where does this leave the ‘angelic’ dream or ‘lie’ of figures like Schopenhauer? For although Schopenhauer’s interest in the spiritual life embraces most of the things we have mentioned so far – love, wisdom, self-transformation, a sense of ourselves as identified with others and the world, morality, aesthetics and meaning – it does express a rather strong aversion to life in the here and now. Is this simply a throwback to unenlightened times or is there more to the position than meets the typical atheist’s eye? I have hinted already that this latter diagnosis may well be appropriate, and I want now to develop this thought, beginning with a more general discussion of the nature and limits of desire, desire being the thing which, for Schopenhauer, provides the surest obstacle to a properly spiritual life. 

3. Desire: some clarifications
Philosophers and others have tended to treat the question of the nature of desire far too simply. So says Mark Platts in a discussion of the role played by desire in morality, his further claim being that this simplifying tendency is encouraged by an undue attention to appetitive desires.​[13]​ An attention along these lines will be important to one for whom a concern with our physical natures is paramount, for appetitive desires are central to our animal nature. Furthermore, it seems plausible to suppose that they can be comprehended without any need to introduce the ‘other-worldly’ ingredients to which the religiously minded are prone – to put it in terms which are familiar from those who protest along these lines, they are amenable to naturalistic treatment. We can note at this preliminary stage that it has not been shown that a more complex conception of desire must involve a rejection of our animal nature, although it may well involve rejecting the assumption that all of our desires are appetitive. As for the idea that non-appetitive desires bring a commitment to ‘other-worldly’ ingredients, everything hangs on the question of the limits of this world, and it is not ruled out that there are conceptions of these limits which invite if not demand such ingredients.​[14]​
	Appetitive desires have a biological function, and they involve distinctive bodily sensations. They make their presence felt in this respect, and when this happens, the desiring subject is motivated to satisfy the relevant desire, such satisfaction leading to the elimination of the relevant sensations and being a source of enjoyment in its own right. So, for example, the felt desire for food leads me to seek out something to eat, the feeling of hunger disappears as I fill myself up, and the whole process is a source of contentment.  
This much applies to my hungry cat, but the picture is more complex in the case of human beings, for things have significance for us in the way that they do not for other animals, and even appetitive desires involve some sense of the value which comes from their satisfaction. ​[15]​ So, for example, I want to eat the biscuits because they’ll abate my hunger or because they taste so good. I can also want to eat them because they were made by somebody I love, although this latter desire takes us beyond the realm of the appetitive in the sense that I can have it without feeling hungry, and the value of satisfying it involves reference to somebody other than myself. ​[16]​  
Appetitive desires do not exhaust the range of kinds of desires that we have, for there is more to human life than wanting to fill oneself up and feel the pleasure this affords. Platts goes so far as to say that most of our desires are non-appetitive, the category of most interest to him being those in which the attention is deflected away from the subject and her satisfactions to the object and its independent value.​[17]​ His focus is the case of moral value, and the desires in question are said to be motivated by the subject’s conception of the independent desirability of their objects.​[18]​ Contrast the felt desire for food where the object’s desirability is purely a function of its being desired: the biscuits seem good to me because I’m hungry, and they would not be remotely appealing if I were not.​[19]​
The general idea here is that we have desires which have nothing to do with wanting to satisfy our bodily appetites, and which are oriented, rather, towards something whose value is not a function of its capacity to deliver such satisfaction, and which serves to elicit the desire in the first place. The position can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle,​[20]​ and it involves conceiving of desire as a representation of the desired object as good in some sense, and with the power thereby to draw the subject outside of herself. The further crucial thought is that it is by virtue of so responding that she is somehow redeemed. Thus Platts, in the context of envisaging what it would be like to lack such desires, talks of an existence which is ‘empty, brutish, and long’.​[21]​ 
The relevant desires are object-directed, and Platts claims that ‘it is at least arguable that any description of a desire using the form desiring object x can be rewritten using the desire that construction’.​[22]​ Talbot Brewer agrees that there are desires which involve being responsive to value, and that they are central to a properly human existence. As he puts it, they allow us to make sense of ‘our depth, of the intelligibility of our life quests, or of the yearnings that draw us to our ideals and to each other’.​[23]​ However, he denies that their objects can be captured in propositional form, ​[24]​ understandably so, given that ‘propositionalism’, on his way of thinking, ‘banishes all evaluative content from desires’.​[25]​ Brewer’s target is the ‘narrowly naturalistic, value-denuded’ version of the position  according to which desire is an attitude towards a proposition whose content can be characterised in purely non-evaluative terms. ​[26]​ The relevant attitude is that of wanting the proposition to be true, and one has it when disposed to act on the world in ways calculated to make the proposition true. It is in the context of so acting that the desire is satisfied.​[27]​ 
The case of Platts suggests that the position is not bound to take this ‘value-denuded’ form, although he himself is open to the possibility of there being desires which resist propositional treatment. Brewer’s further objection to such treatment is that it fails to accommodate the desires which are of most significance to his purposes, namely, those which draw us to our ideals and to each other, and by virtue of which we can be said to possess a depth. The desires themselves are said to involve a depth in the sense that their objects exceed the desirer’s explicit articulation thereof, and cannot, in any case, be reduced to a state of affairs which the subject, by virtue of desiring, is disposed to produce - hence their resistance to propositional treatment. The further claim is that we are capable of penetrating and extending this depth as we come to a more adequate conception of the goods the relevant desires draw us towards.​[28]​   
	Brewer takes himself to be articulating and defending a version of the Platonist/Neo-Platonist claim that we have desires which attract us to the highest good. ​[29]​ These desires are related to one another as motivating intimations of a goodness which is variously and progressively revealed and realised in the activities we pursue on their basis, when, for example, we are motivated by artistic, moral, or philosophical excellence. Desire is the state we are in when we ‘feel the tug’ of the relevant values, and it is this tug which moves us to act accordingly, when, say, we act with compassion or set about writing something of philosophical worth.​[30]​ Brewer makes it clear that this supposedly ‘world-making’ concession offers no hostage to the disputed position, and that to suppose otherwise is to fail to distinguish between the desire’s object and its expression. As he puts it, ‘[t]he object of such a desire is that towards which it draws our evaluative focus, not the state of the world that we are inclined to bring about when our evaluative attention is focused in this way’.​[31]​  
	Desire thus understood has a teleological structure, and we ourselves qua desiring beings are engaged in an ongoing quest to articulate and to embody an adequate conception of the good. Brewer contrasts this with the picture according to which living is simply a matter of throwing one’s causal weight around the world in response to some state of affairs one seeks to bring about, and he objects to this picture not simply because it fails to accommodate the ongoing narrative of a properly human existence, but because it leaves no room for the desires which motivate such a narrative in the first place. We know already that such desires are oriented towards the good, and Brewer claims that it is an effect of so desiring that one is taken outside of oneself. It is in this context that he talks of desire’s ‘“unselfing” influence’,​[32]​ claiming that it frees us ‘from that most banal and obsessive of human distractions, the self’.​[33]​ The idea is familiar from Platts. 

4. The spiritual life, again
We have a picture of desire which promises to make sense of at least some of the features which, by the lights of our disputants, are fundamental to a properly spiritual life. The idea that it draws us to our ideals and to each other accommodates the values – love, trust, reverence, and wisdom - which are so important to Solomon, and it is surely a consequence of being so drawn that we are given a sense of ourselves as identified with others and the world. It is a further feature of the position that desire is something which is deepened and refined over time as the subject struggles to understand and to articulate the values it brings into view. It is in this sense that she is said to be caught up in a ‘life-quest’. Crucially, however, this is no mere intellectual exercise, and Brewer makes it clear that the journey at issue here is irreducibly practical, and expressed at various levels of evaluative response. He would be happy to grant with Cottingham then that we are concerned with ‘forms of life that put a premium on certain kinds of intensely focused moral and aesthetic response, or on the search for deeper reflective awareness of the meaning of our lives and of our relationship to others and to the natural world’. We can note finally that it is fundamental to the overall picture that the transformation which comes from engaging in this desire-fuelled quest has nothing to do with relinquishing the self in favour of something beyond this world and our humanity – as if one becomes something other than a human self or nothing at all. So we can grant with Solomon that the self is expanded rather than abandoned, this metaphor being entirely appropriate to Brewer’s talk in this context of the self’s growing depth. ​[34]​ 
	  This is all very well, but the conception of desire to which we have been introduced has its origins in a Platonist/Neo-Platonist way of thinking, and we are familiar with the complaint that Platonism involves reference to ‘other-worldly’ ingredients, undermines the significance of the here and now, and points us in the direction of just the kind of ‘angelic ideal’ which stands opposed to life and desire. As Roger Scruton has described Plato’s image of spiritual ascent, it involves the discarding of desire and its replacement with an ‘act of serene contemplation of the Form of the Beautiful’.​[35]​ We are reminded of Soskice’s talk of something ‘still and luminous, turned to the future and far from our daily lives’, and Scruton’s later and more pejorative reference to a ‘bloodless philosophical passion’ offers a natural prelude to the Nietzschean protestations with which we began. 
	I have hinted already that these supposedly ‘other-worldly’ ingredients may be rather more significant than our disputants suggest, and that everything hangs on the question of how we are to comprehend the limits of the world against which they are supposedly defined. The Nietzschean encourages us to suppose that it incorporates all that pertains to life, nature, and humanity, the implication being that the move envisaged by the Platonist involves a declared aversion to these things, and, ultimately, the ‘deification of nothingness’. We know also that Schopenhauer is a familiar target in this context, his metaphysical framework being one which is said to express the offending nihilism to the cost of our proper humanity and spirituality, and which also involves an explicit rejection of desire. It will be helpful then to look more closely at his position with a view to determining whether, and in what sense, he falls foul of the relevant objections, and where this leaves the question of the relation between the spiritual life and desire. It is to this task that I now turn. 

5. Schopenhauer on desire
The textual evidence suggests that Schopenhauer does, indeed, preach a transcending of desire, taking it to be a ‘delusion and snare’ on the spiritual path, to repeat Soskice’s terminology. Desire, as he sees it, is fundamental to our nature as willing beings, will being the craving, malevolent force which constitutes the innermost essence of things, and which is expressed at every level of life as it strives to maintain itself in existence.​[36]​ It is expressed in human life at the level of desire, and desire thus understood involves a lack or deficiency which brings suffering to its subject.​[37]​ This lack can be filled and the suffering abated because desires can be satisfied. However, they can be satisfied only temporarily, and are compelled to rear up again, giving rise to more suffering, demanding similar satisfaction, and so on ad infinitum. Hence:

Absolutely every human life continues to flow on between willing and attainment. Of its nature the wish is pain; attainment quickly begets satiety. The goal was only apparent; possession takes away its charm. The wish, the need, appears again on the scene under a new form; if it does not, then dreariness, emptiness, and boredom follow, the struggle against which is just as painful as is that against want.​[38]​

The result is that:

The subject of willing is constantly lying on the revolving wheel of Ixion, is always drawing water in the sieve of the Danaids, and is the eternally thirsting Tantalus. ​[39]​

Schopenhauer’s verdict is that: 

(s)o long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never obtain lasting happiness or peace…without peace and calm, true well-being is absolutely impossible. ​[40]​

	The idea that desire involves a lack in the subject which demands to be filled fits the case of bodily appetites, and it is familiar that such desires can involve suffering, witness the discomfort which comes from being excessively hungry or thirsty. Pain occurs when the deprivation is severe, but it does not follow that desire is an intrinsically painful state, and even appetitive desires can be ‘suffered’ with pleasure, the force of the term in this latter context serving to capture the sense in which they can be said to ‘assail’ us.​[41]​ As I put it previously, they make their presence felt. Schopenhauer is concerned with the desires of human beings. So he grants the value we attach to the things we desire – hence the reference to our ‘constant hopes and fears’ - and is not, in any case, concerned exclusively with the bodily appetites. Rather, his focus is any desire whatsoever, and I have noted already that he takes them to be expressions of a hungry and malevolent will. The further crucial claim is that they are exclusively self-concerned. As one commentator has put it, it’s a matter of ‘each individualisation of [the will] wanting its own way, I wanting mine, you yours, others theirs, each asserting itself, subjecting others or subjected to them, each implicitly saying , “I”, “I”, and tolerating others only as they serve it (making the I more I)’.​[42]​  
	The Platonist would object that Schopenhauer has failed to acknowledge those desires which involve being responsive to something independently valuable, and which display an ‘unselfing’ influence in this regard. Schopenhauer promotes an analogous deflection away from the self, the difference being that the state of mind he envisages in this context is one in which the self is no longer given up to the ‘throng of desire’. So there is a deflection away from the desiring self. As noted, however, he is operating with a conception according to which desire is exclusively egoistic. It follows therefore that he is recommending a deflection away from egoism, i.e. from the very distractions which, for the Platonist, are silenced by the desires which attract us to an independent source of value. 
	Schopenhauer makes it abundantly clear that there is more to the self than egoism, the main point of his work being to discourage the reader from such distractions and towards the very things which, it has been agreed, are central to a properly spiritual life. This is spelled out in his discussion of aesthetic and moral experience – contexts in which, for a time at least, consciousness is no longer ‘filled by our will’.​[43]​ As Schopenhauer puts it, we ‘lose ourselves entirely in [the] object’​[44]​ when we attend to it aesthetically, and the man of virtue ‘no longer makes the egoistical distinction between himself and the person of others, but takes as much in interest in the sufferings of other individuals as in his own’.​[45]​ 
All of this requires that there is something beyond will, and although Schopenhauer sometimes gives the impression that there is not, he makes clear eventually that the nothingness envisaged and feared by his critics (‘as children fear darkness’) is equivalent to blank non-existence only on the misguided assumption that will is everything.​[46]​ This assumption is challenged in his account of aesthetic and moral consciousness, and if we accept with Brewer that the relevant responses are desire-involving in some sense, then, terminology notwithstanding, he is conceding to a Platonist conception of desire and granting hereby that there are desirable desires. 
Thus far there is nothing remotely anti-life in any of this except in so far as ‘life’ is taken to be equivalent to an unrelenting egoism. It is familiar, however, that Schopenhauer’s position culminates in a description of mystical experience, that this is his soteriological ideal, and that it involves a wholesale rejection of anything pertaining to this world and our humanity (proper or otherwise). After all, the will has been abolished in its entirety,​[47]​ and this is said to bring an analogous ‘abolition and disappearance of the world’ (subject and object included).​[48]​ As he puts it himself, ‘there is certainly left only nothing’.​[49]​ He quickly adds, however – and these are the final words of the book – that ‘what remains after the complete abolition of the will is for all who are still full of the will [my italics], assuredly nothing. But also conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is –nothing’.​[50]​ He refers in this context to an ‘ocean-like calmness of the spirit’, and offers the terms ‘ecstasy’, ‘rapture’, ‘union with God’, and ‘Nirvana’ as ways of referring to the state of mind at issue here, even whilst granting that all such conceptualizations are inadequate. The further crucial claim is that we have a foretaste of what it involves in moral and aesthetic experience.​[51]​
We seem to be returned to Soskice’s ‘still and luminous’ something which is ‘far from our daily lives’ in the sense that it transcends human existence. The idea that it transcends human existence is problematic on the assumption that being human exhausts our reality, although blank nothingness might be thought to be preferable if such existence involves unrelenting pain. Schopenhauer takes pain to be intrinsic to egoistic desire, and I have already questioned this assumption as far as appetitive desire is concerned. What of egoistic desire more generally? It does not make its presence felt in the manner of hunger or thirst, and is not therefore suffered in this (innocuous) respect. Rather, it is more a matter of the subject making her presence felt as she does what is required to get what she wants, i.e. throws her causal weight around the world in Brewer’s pejorative sense. 
Could desire in this sense be a source of pain? Schopenhauer draws this conclusion on the ground that it is like trying to drink water from a sieve, the implication being that we are failing to get what we want. Given that egoistic desires can be satisfied in one clear enough sense, he must mean that the satisfaction is not genuine, and that, to continue the image, egoistic desires are like sieves which filter out what we really want. They are a source of pain in this sense. 
The Nietzschean interprets this as an objection to desire per se, claiming that what Schopenhauer really wants –and what he thinks we all really want – is the permanent stilling of desire. The evidence for this – alongside the fact that Schopenhauer objects to its endless recurrence – is that the ideal he proposes involves a state of mind in which desire has been discarded once and for all. Add to this that we are essentially desiring beings, and that desire is desirable in any case, and the picture does indeed become a piece of diabolical work. 
I have denied that desire is invariably desirable, and interpreted Schopenhauer’s objection to desire as an objection to egoism. There is no need to go so far as to say that egoism should be eradicated, the important point being that it must not be given free reign. The Platonist avoids this implication by introducing a level of desire in which the focus is deflected away from the hungry self towards an independent source of value, and I have argued that Schopenhauer operates with a terminological variant upon this idea. What of the ocean-like calmness of the spirit to which he refers? Does this not mean that desire has been discarded, and hence, that the satisfaction he has in mind demands its (and our) elimination? Yes, on the assumption that calmness of spirit is equivalent to blank nothingness, but Schopenhauer has denied that this is so, even whilst granting that there are limits to what can be said and known in this context. But how could such a state be of relevance to our daily lives? Is it not simply an angelic ideal in which we want for nothing and our aspiration to which involves wanting non-existence? I have already challenged this latter claim on Schopenhauer’s behalf. As for the idea that it is too far removed from our daily lives to make any real difference, the response to this objection is to be found in Schopenhauer’s claim that the relevant state of mind is foretasted in moral and aesthetic experience. For this suggests that it precisely is relevant to our daily lives, assuming that such lives accommodate the relevant responses. (If they do not, then we are back with an unrelenting egoism.) We can note finally that this state of mind must also be desire-involving in some sense – at least, this is so if we accept that the relevant human experiences can be analogously described. This is borne out by Schopenhauer’s use of the terms ‘ecstasy’ and ‘rapture’ to refer to it, their etymology testifying to just the kind of ‘unselfing’ influence which, for the Platonist, is intrinsic to desire.  

6. Conclusions
The position at which we have arrived grants us the right to say that desire is intrinsic to the spiritual life in the sense that there is a kind of desire which draws us towards the values which are fundamental to such a life, although this is not to deny that there are desires which have the opposite effect, ​[52]​ and others which can be comprehended in purely biological terms. What of the worry that the ingredients to which we are committed hereby are too other-worldly to be taken seriously? They certainly count as such if ‘world’ is comprehended in purely egoistic terms, but there are no good grounds for accepting such a limited conception, and neither theist nor atheist could plausibly deny that the life of the spirit is other-worldly in this sense. What of the sense which leads the typical naturalist to reject Platonism on the ground that it involves the postulation of a second, supernatural, realm? Again, everything depends on what ‘natural’ means in this context, and if the point of moving in a supernatural direction is simply to avoid scientism, then we are obliged to take this option very seriously indeed.​[53]​ It is worth noting also that supernaturalism is not best viewed in the overly literalist terms assumed by those for whom it is a framework for the intellectually challenged – terms which suggest that Plato really did commit to the existence of a two-decker universe.​[54]​ We might add that it is equally misguided to interpret the heaven of the theist or the nirvana of the Buddhist in these literalist terms – as if it is the contradiction of life instead of its transfiguration and eternal yes!​[55]​ 
What I have just said – or rather, what Nietzsche has just said – suggests that the position of his target is not so far removed from his own preferred alternative. It has been left unclear how Nietzsche himself conceives of life’s transfiguration, but the idea that he is defending a form of spirituality puts paid to the idea that his preferred life of desire involves an unrelenting egoism, although it remains open that he is doing no such thing.​[56]​ The Platonist sees desire as the state we are in when we feel the tug of the values they reveal, the implication being that, without this tug, we should cease to desire. Does this mean that Nietzsche cannot accommodate such desires? Presumably not if he rejects the relevant values, although it remains open that he is operating with a modified conception of value – one moreover which could be seen as a product of the desire-involving journey we have described. The alternative is to suppose on his behalf that there is no objective source of value, and that the life of desire can be reconstructed in its absence. This is one way of interpreting Robert Pippin’s conception of Nietzsche’s anti-nihilistic task, the aim, as he puts it, being to divorce our longings from transcendent aspirations,​[57]​ and to arrive at ‘a picture of striving without the illusion of a determinate, natural lack that we can fill’.​[58]​ 
The idea that we have aspirations which are transcendent is one way of giving expression to desire’s ‘unselfing’ influence, and I have noted already that there are conceptions of this influence which we would do well to avoid – those, in particular, which make it look as if we are being moved in the direction of a realm which could have no bearing upon our proper human existence and which serves to contradict everything it involves. So the notion of a transcendent longing is not invariably problematic, and it may be exactly what is needed if we are to accommodate the ingredients of a properly spiritual life. As for the idea that we should be courting a picture of striving without the illusion of a determinate, natural lack to be filled, the Platonist agrees that this picture must be avoided, and would no doubt accept with Schopenhauer that it is appropriate, at best, to the case of egoistic desire.​[59]​ So it is denied that desire is simply a matter of wanting to fill oneself up. Rather, it can involve an attraction beyond the self towards the values which motivate it in the first place. Self and desire are deepened in the process, and we might even say of such a desirer that she is in a condition of eternal thirst. However, she is not the eternally thirsting Tantalus, for she is receiving something in the process, namely, the goodness to which she is (eternally) drawn by virtue of desiring in this way.​[60]​ 
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